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The Emergence of Change in Unexpected Places: Resourcing across 
organizational practices in strategic change 
ABSTRACT 
In our longitudinal, in-depth case study of strategic change within the English National Health 
Service we compare three practices related to contracting healthcare services. Contrary to what 
we would have believed from the extant literature, we found that the most profound change did 
not emerge in practices that witnessed the greatest increase in the quantity of resources or in 
which change agents were given the highest degree of control. Instead, change emerged in a 
practice that was not treated as a priority and that subsequently attracted interest from a very 
limited number of individuals. Our findings contribute to the resourcing literature by showing 
that the ability to use resources is shaped by how they are valued and distributed and that 
strategic change initiatives can act as triggers for resource revaluations and redistributions. 
Specifically, we demonstrate that strategic change initiatives may contribute to the emergence of 
favorable conditions for change in practices that do not become associated with valued resources. 
This is because a lack of valued resources attracts limited interest from stakeholders, thereby 
allowing changes to emerge as powerful agents face minimal coordination costs and scrutiny 
when attempting to align arrangements with their own interests. Our study thereby shows how 
and why change initiatives can trigger divergent developments across multiple practices and lead 
to change emergence in unexpected places. It also highlights the role of what we call resourcing 
space in contributing to emergent change.  
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Strategic change initiatives are costly. They involve committing financial, human, and other 
types of resources to parts of an organization that are targeted for change by senior managers. 
Failure to achieve strategic change objectives is consistently attributed to insufficient resource 
provision (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006). However, change can also emerge where it is least 
expected and without the provision of a large amount of resources (e.g. Mintzberg & Waters, 
1985; Plowman et al., 2007). Hence, providing resources appears to be critical for effective 
change implementation – but not always. This suggests that our understanding of the 
relationships between resources and strategic change remains somewhat underdeveloped. 
To explore these relationships, we examined the unfolding of multiple practices related to 
contracting public healthcare services following the initiation of strategic change within the 
English National Health Service (NHS). Faced with spiraling costs and the need to meet 
nationally mandated targets, executives at an organization we call MgmtAgency1 launched an 
initiative to alter the way local hospital contracts were managed. Yet, even several years later, 
and despite the provision of a substantial amount of resources, the practice of managing hospital 
contracts remained largely unchanged. Instead, another practice, namely the contracting of 
mental health services, changed to such an extent that it became the showpiece of strategic 
change efforts both internally and externally even though it had not been prioritized by 
executives or given more resources. In fact, this practice witnessed a withdrawal of 
administrative support and was even referred to as “contracting crap” by the manager who was 
formally put in charge. 
As we tried to make sense of these surprising developments we were confronted with an 
unexpected finding: Favorable conditions for change emerged at least in part due to strategic 
                                                 
1 Pseudonyms are used throughout to maintain anonymity. 
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change initiators’ direction of interests towards the hospital contract management practice and – 
crucially – away from the mental health contract management practice. Individuals involved in 
mental health contract management thereby benefitted from a general lack of interest in this 
practice, which provided sufficient space for them to rapidly implement a series of changes 
without the need to engage in lengthy negotiations. 
Based on our findings we conceptualize strategic change initiatives as triggers of potential 
resource revaluations and redistributions across an organization that direct agents’ interests 
towards certain practices and away from others. Instead of inhibiting change, the direction of 
interests away from certain practices may (unintentionally) contribute to the emergence of what 
we term ‘resourcing space’: a space characterized by low coordination costs, minimal scrutiny 
and a willingness to challenge that allows for mutual adjustment and accommodation so as to 
enable and direct actions. We therefore argue that strategic change initiatives do not simply 
provide resources for change or influence how they are used. They also (intentionally and/or 
unintentionally) facilitate and inhibit the use of potential resources across different parts of an 
organization. These findings contribute to our understanding of the relationships between 
resources and strategic change in several ways. 
Firstly, they highlight that change agents’2 control over valuable resources is a necessary 
condition for change (Kellogg, 2009; Pfeffer, 1993; Walsh, Hinings, Greenwood, & Ranson, 
1981) but that what is considered valuable in a particular context is not pre-determined. By 
shifting and shaping what is and what is not valued, strategic change initiatives can allow a few 
                                                 
2 We refer to “agents” and “change agents” rather than organization members throughout this paper to capture 
individuals and groups within and without an organization whose behavior may directly or indirectly shape 
organizational activities. Moreover, we use the term “agents” instead of “actors” to highlight that individual and 
group behavior is fundamentally shaped by socialization experiences rather than being the outcome of rational 
actions performed by fully conscious and autonomous individuals (cf. Chia & Holt, 2006). 
  4 
 
 
 
agents to gain control of, and alter, practices that the majority of agents do not associate with 
highly valued resources. 
Secondly, they build on the nascent resourcing perspective that highlights agents’ skillful use, 
rather than the mere presence, of potential resources with regard to effecting change (Feldman, 
2004; Howard-Grenville, 2007; Sonenshein, 2014). By taking into account revaluations and 
redistributions across an organization we can account for why certain practices attract more or 
less scrutiny and lower coordination costs than others, thereby facilitating and inhibiting agents’ 
ability to use the potential resources at their disposal within them. 
Thirdly, our findings contribute to theorizing concerning the role of space in facilitating 
change (Kellogg, 2009; Rao & Dutta, 2012). We not only show that limiting interference allows 
change agents to negotiate and implement change via effective use of potential resources. 
Importantly, we also find that resourcing space may emerge in particular practices as a(n 
unintended) consequence of strategic change initiatives directing interests elsewhere. 
RESOURCES AND RESOURCING IN STRATEGIC CHANGE 
We start by discussing key streams of literature that have been influential in furthering our 
understanding of the relationships between resources and strategic change. Firstly, research has 
focused on the availability and quantity of resources needed for facilitating strategic change. 
However, these studies have been inconclusive and ambiguous; for example, as to whether large 
amounts of resources enable strategic change. Secondly, the literature has examined how the 
distribution of resources across stakeholders can facilitate or inhibit strategic change. In 
particular, this work has emphasized that a shift in resource control is needed for organizational 
change to emerge in established organizations. Thirdly, instead of attributing change outcomes to 
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the presence or absence of large amounts or control of resources, recent work has examined how 
resources are used and how use, in turn, contributes to inertia or change over time. Our focus 
below is thus on these literature streams which were most relevant for our study of strategic 
change — studies of availability and quantity of resources, research on distribution and control 
of resources, and practice-based theories emphasizing the use of resources. 
Resources have long been recognized as important in strategic change (see Kraatz & Zajac, 
2001 for an overview). For instance, excess financial and human resources are proposed to 
facilitate change by providing room for experimentation (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). Without 
sufficient resources, organizations have limited opportunities to generate, test and implement 
novel ideas. However, the presence of a very large number of (new) ideas within an organization 
is also recognized to generate challenges with regard to their selection and coordination which 
can, in turn, hinder implementation (Brunsson, 1985; Kanter, 1996). Further, an abundance of 
resources is also theorized to generate inertia and inhibit change. For instance, the availability of 
large amounts of resources is proposed to lead to “competency traps” and “barriers to learning” 
by discouraging the search for, and development of, novel resources (Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
Levinthal & March, 1993). Given the unclear relationship between the availability of resources 
and change, as well the overall high rate of failure of strategic change initiatives (Beer, Eisenstat, 
& Spector, 1990; McNulty & Ferlie, 2002), scholars are increasingly interested in examining 
intra-organizational structures and dynamics to uncover why change initiatives rarely develop 
according to plan (Denis, Lamothe, & Langley, 2001; Pettigrew, Woodman, & Cameron, 2001).  
Understanding how, why or when strategic change may emerge thus also requires an 
understanding of who is in a position to influence the design, selection and implementation of 
change initiatives (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Pettigrew, 1973). In other words, it is vital to 
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know which stakeholders control the organization’s resources. As resource dependency theory 
asserts (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), those who are able to solve an 
organization’s problems and provide access to critical resources tend to have the highest degree 
of influence over organizational developments (Crozier, 1964; Perrow, 1970; Thompson, 1967), 
including stability and change. However, substantial organizational change is unlikely to emerge 
in established organizations without a shift in resource control. This is due to two principal 
reasons. First, those stakeholders who dominate an organization, or certain parts of it, may be 
unwilling to introduce changes that they could interpret as undermining their own authority, 
which derives in part from their control of resources. A vivid example is presented in Kellogg’s 
(2012) study of status quo defenders’ attempts to block hospital reforms. Second, dominant 
stakeholders may not recognize the need to respond to changing environmental conditions 
because they have become accustomed to the status quo (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003: 234–235). 
Additionally, those who do not control large amounts of valuable resources may not only lack 
sufficient influence to initiate and implement change. They may even hesitate to push for change 
by accepting their own subordinate position. For example, Lockett and colleagues show how a 
nurse who was tasked with introducing and implementing reforms in the NHS “scaled down her 
ambition” (Lockett, Currie, Finn, Martin, & Waring, 2014: 1117) because she was not willing to 
challenge doctors who were in control of high status medical knowledge. 
By contrast, practice-based theories (Golsorkhi, Rouleau, Seidl, & Vaara, 2010; Johnson, 
Langley, Melin, & Whittington, 2007, Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011) are particularly attentive to 
how resources are used and how use, in turn, may shape subsequent developments. In particular, 
the “resourcing” perspective (Feldman, 2004; Feldman & Worline, 2012; Howard-Grenville, 
2007; Sonenshein, 2014) builds on the practice turn in the social sciences to argue that it is how 
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people use potential resources, not their distribution per se, that influence whether and how 
change will occur. Seen in this way, all things are consequently conceptualized as ‘potential’ 
resources that only become ‘actual’ resources through their use (Feldman, 2004; Sonenshein, 
2014). Hence, the same potential resource can be used in many different ways (or not at all) and 
ultimately contribute to the emergence of change or towards maintaining stability. For example, 
as Feldman and Worline (2012) note, breadcrumbs began being used to produce meatballs in 
times of meat shortages. Therefore, depending on how bread is used, it can either act as a 
substitute for meat and thereby replace practices of cooking and consuming meatballs or, by 
being used as a supplement, it can maintain them. This emphasis on use, rather than the intrinsic 
properties of resources, implies a change of thinking from resources as stable entities to 
understanding processes of resourcing. 
In the context of strategic change the resourcing perspective shifts attention away from 
attempts to understand how or why the provision, or withdrawal, of resources enables or limits 
change. It instead draws attention to how and when particular actions that are performed as part 
of strategic change initiatives can contribute to forms of resource use. This use, in turn, may 
trigger dynamics that facilitate or inhibit the emergence of change over time. 
Broadening Resourcing to Understand Strategic Change across Practices 
While the resourcing perspective is valuable in demonstrating how change unfolds 
“endogenously” (Feldman, 2004) within particular practices when agents (do and do not) make 
use of potential resources, it has yet to be applied to further our understanding of how a strategic 
change initiative may shape resource use and trigger developments across multiple 
organizational practices. The consideration of dynamics across multiple practices is important 
because we know that change in one practice may have potentially significant consequences for 
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other coupled practices (MacKay & Chia, 2013; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003: 40–43). We can 
therefore conceptualize organizations as “resource sharing systems” (Pettigrew, 1973: 169) or 
interrelated practices within a social space (Bourdieu, 2005; Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008) in 
which multiple organizational projects or issues vie for organization members’ contributions in 
terms of resource use (including time and effort) at any given time (cf. Cohen, March, & Olsen, 
1972). To understand why change may emerge in certain practices and not others thus requires 
understanding how resource use is directed and what the consequences of this direction may be. 
Howard-Grenville (2007), drawing on Bourdieu (1977) , has shown that this direction is 
dependent on attracting sufficient interest from key stakeholders by successfully associating 
certain issues, potential resources and practices with value. Yet, we still know relatively little 
about how the distribution of resources and their association with value may ultimately 
contribute to stability and change across an organization following the initiation of strategic 
change. We explore these dynamics via an analysis of developments across three practices 
related to the contracting of healthcare services within the NHS following the initiation of 
strategic change. This allows us to develop new insights concerning how and why change 
initiatives can trigger divergent developments across multiple practices and lead to change 
emergence in unexpected places. 
METHODS 
Research Setting 
The NHS was established in 1948 and consists of a variety of publicly funded organizations 
that are responsible for meeting the population’s healthcare needs. It has witnessed a series of 
structural changes over the past decades in response to cost pressures driven by expensive 
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treatments and increasing demand (Storey, Bullivant, & Corbett-Nolan, 2011). Below we 
introduce the stakeholders and practices that are the particular focus of this study. 
Stakeholders. From 1991 onwards the English healthcare system has consisted of two types 
of organizations with formally distinct mandates, namely (1) local and regional healthcare 
management agencies and (2) healthcare service provider organizations. The latter generally fall 
within one of the four following categories3: hospitals, community care organizations, mental 
healthcare organizations, and general practice surgeries. 
Hospitals generally perform treatments within hospital settings and are usually associated 
with specialist doctors (i.e. ‘hospital consultants’) although they often employ a large variety of 
other occupational groups. Community care organizations, by contrast, perform a range of 
treatments and types of care outside of hospital settings, such as in people’s homes, community 
clinics and general practice surgeries. These organizations usually employ a large number of 
nurses who look after patients with long term health conditions. Mental healthcare organizations 
employ psychiatrists, psychologists and other mental health specialists of whom some provide 
services in purpose built facilities (former asylums) and others in community settings. Finally, 
general practice surgeries are run and owned by medical doctors – General Practitioners (GPs) – 
who diagnose patients, prescribe medication, provide some forms of treatment themselves, and 
refer patients to specialized services, including those mentioned above. Individuals are usually 
not able to use the services of publicly funded specialized providers without a referral letter from 
a GP. GPs thus have a gatekeeper role in the NHS: A large portion of public funding is directly 
related to paying for the services to which they refer patients. 
                                                 
3 Several other NHS affiliated types of organizations, such as dental surgeries and pharmacies, exist that are not 
considered in this study. Furthermore, mixed or hybrid organizational types exist. 
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Healthcare Contract Management. The NHS is formally managed via contracts. Local and 
regional healthcare management organizations receive an annual budget that they distribute to 
healthcare service provider organizations on the basis of contracts that they negotiate with one 
another. Contracts with large providers are typically re-negotiated once a year and specify which 
services will be reimbursed, as well as associated rates and conditions. 
Apart from specifying contractual terms, healthcare management organizations are 
responsible for monitoring providers’ performance in respect to (mostly nationally defined) 
healthcare quality indicators and service activity levels. For this purpose healthcare management 
organizations review the latest indicators and forecasts with provider organizations at monthly 
performance meetings. Healthcare management organizations report these data to the 
Department of Health and have an obligation to intervene when performance targets are not met. 
Providers who fail to meet targets or other contractual conditions may be penalized via fines and 
the termination of contracts. Moreover, due to an essentially “bottomless pit” of demand but a 
limited budget for local healthcare services, healthcare management organizations have an 
interest in ensuring that these are performed as efficiently as possible. 
MgmtAgency. MgmtAgency4 was one of around 150 local healthcare management 
organizations across England. During the period studied (2009-2013) it employed around 250 
staff5 across divisions responsible for areas such as healthcare contract management, public 
health, medicines management, healthcare governance, and service redesign, alongside 
traditional finance, strategy, public relations, and HR divisions. It distributed the majority of its 
total healthcare budget to a handful of large, quasi-monopolistic healthcare service providers in 
                                                 
4 Pseudonyms are used throughout to maintain confidentiality 
5 Total staffing number converted to full time equivalents 
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the region, including a university teaching hospital (“LocalTeachingHospital”) employing over 
5,000 staff, as well as a district general hospital (“LocalGeneralHospital”), a community care 
organization (“CommunityProvider”), and a mental healthcare services provider (“MentalHealth 
Provider”), each of which employed between 1,000 and 3,000 staff. Moreover, it reimbursed 
about 800 local GPs affiliated with over 100 GP surgeries across the region for their services 
under the pre-defined terms of the national GP contract6. Some of these GPs provided advisory 
services to MgmtAgency with regard to local service design and (as designated clinical 
representatives in the region) were able to veto proposed changes but were not directly involved 
in actual contract management activities. 
Contract management at MgmtAgency was initially handled by two separate teams, labeled 
“hospital” and “out-of-hospital,” with the latter being responsible for dealing with 
CommunityProvider, MentalHealth Provider and several dozen much smaller organizations. An 
overview of relevant stakeholders and practices is provided in Figure 1. 
--- insert Figure 1 about here --- 
Data Collection 
We began collecting data with regard to healthcare contract management immediately 
following the publication of the UK government’s proposal to reform the NHS by ‘liberating’ it 
from unnecessary bureaucracy and empowering clinicians to make it more responsive to patient 
needs (DH, 2010). This appeared to be an ideal setting to study how the redistribution of formal 
control over budgets (i.e. potential resources) across stakeholder groups could shape 
organizational practices. Moreover, this shift of control intrigued us given the fundamental 
                                                 
6 See http://www.nhsemployers.org/your-workforce/primary-care-contacts/general-medical-services 
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alteration of existing organizational governance arrangements. However, interviews with 
MgmtAgency managers from September 2010 onwards revealed that their executives had 
already begun to attempt to increase clinical involvement in contract management before reform 
proposals had been announced. Having identified a site where strategic change was being 
initiated, and given our interest in gaining a very detailed and thorough understanding of the 
phenomenon, we subsequently requested permission to conduct an in-depth case study 
concerning the evolution of contract management at MgmtAgency. 
Consistent with a qualitative, longitudinal research design (Langley, 2009) we collected data 
from a wide range of sources, including over 700 hours of direct observation, 66 semi-structured 
interviews and over 20 GB of archival data. Apart from five interviews all data were solely 
collected by the first author. The time period we focus on in this study is July 2009 – March 
2013. We used July 2009 as a starting point because relevant contract management meeting 
minutes were available as of this date and to ensure we had data that preceded the arrival of a 
new executive team at MgmtAgency (September 2009).  
Observation. The first author attended over 60 hours of meetings and events related to 
healthcare systems management and contract management between December 2010 and August 
2012. Detailed notes concerning content, as well as dynamics between participants, were taken 
and exported to NVivo for analysis. This was followed by two shadowing studies (Czarniawska, 
2007), each lasting three months, in which MgmtAgency contract managers were followed for 
three to four full workdays per week. This entailed attending a variety of meetings, observing 
managers working at their desks, and engaging in informal conversations to follow up on things 
the researcher did not understand and elucidate managers’ perceived challenges. Apart from 
informal conversations, active participation was limited to a small number of administrative 
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tasks, such as assisting with meeting minutes. Great care was taken not to be identified as a 
member of MgmtAgency so as to gain trust from members of provider organizations. 
Interviews. Because our main objective was to understand how and why practices related to 
contract management were developing, we used a purposeful sampling strategy by interviewing 
those individuals who were most involved in these practices. These individuals were readily 
identifiable from meeting observations, meeting minutes, interviews and informal conversations. 
Between July 2010 and October 2014 we conducted 26 interviews with MgmtAgency managers, 
25 with members of local healthcare service provider organizations, 9 with GP representatives, 
and 6 with members of other public healthcare service related organizations in other regions. 
Several managers were interviewed twice to capture potential changes over time. Interviews 
lasted between 30 minutes and two and a half hours, averaging about one hour. Apart from a 
handful of exceptions in which we relied on handwritten notes, these were recorded, transcribed, 
and exported to NVivo for analysis. Interviews were semi-structured, containing broad questions 
about perceived changes and challenges.  
Archival data. Finally, we gained access to a large amount of confidential documents. This 
included reports distributed at meetings, detailed meeting minutes, copies of contracts, 
MgmtAgency strategy reports and presentations, memos, letters and diaries from 23 managers. 
Additionally, we collected publicly accessible information from relevant organizations’ websites, 
such as annual reports, individual profiles, and conflicts of interest registers. 
Data Analysis 
As we followed developments related to healthcare contract management at MgmtAgency in 
real time we began to notice that these differed across service areas. Specifically, mental health 
contract management appeared to have changed relatively quickly from an administrative 
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practice with very limited clinical involvement towards “a successful clinically-led 
commissioning model” (MgmtAgency meeting minutes, May 2012) consisting of frequent and 
coordinated interaction dominated by GP representatives and mental healthcare clinicians. These 
changes were also resulting in alterations to the provision of existing services in the region which 
were described as a “radical transformation” (draft trade journal article, Sep 2011). 
Hospital and community care contract management, by contrast, did not change as rapidly or 
profoundly. Developments within mental health contract management were therefore at times 
described as “ahead of the game” (GP, observation notes, Sep 2012; MgmtAgency manager, 
observation notes, Oct 2012) and considered as a source of “learning” for other service areas 
(MgmtAgency meeting minutes, May 2012). These developments especially caught our attention 
because mental health contract management had evidently not been regarded as a strategic 
priority and had even experienced a withdrawal of certain potential resources, as discussed 
below.  
We compared changes concerning the level of clinical involvement in contract management 
before and after the initiation of strategic change using a range of measures, including lists of 
attendees at contract management meetings, interview accounts, the number of scheduled 
meetings between provider account managers and local GPs (from available diaries), and 
(confidential as well as public) documents. We used October 2010 as the beginning of the period 
‘after’ change initiation because MgmtAgency’s contract management division witnessed major 
restructuring during this time. The results are summarized in Tables 1a and 1b. 
---- insert Tables 1a and 1b about here ---- 
To understand why contract management practices had developed differently we coded our 
data for facilitating and inhibiting conditions for change. Two central themes emerged: First, we 
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noticed that GPs were generally willing to challenge non-medically trained service provider 
representatives but that they largely refrained from challenging hospital doctors. We coded this 
theme as ‘designated change agents’ (un)willingness to challenge’. Second, our analysis pointed 
to problems associated with reaching agreements among a large number of highly interested 
individuals concerning issues related to hospital and community care contract management. By 
contrast, mental healthcare contract management was conspicuous due to the absence of 
participation and monitoring. We coded this theme as ‘coordination costs and scrutiny’. Selected 
evidence for these themes is presented in Table 2. 
--- insert Table 2 about here --- 
We then analyzed our data to identify why and how these conditions had emerged. With 
regard to ‘designated change agents’ (un)willingness to challenge’ we drew on existing literature 
that highlights that agents generally adopt a subordinate position relative to those they associate 
with highly valued resources. We therefore examined our data to understand which potential 
resources were valued highly by GPs and with whom they associated these valued resources. 
--- insert Table 3 about here --- 
With regard to differing levels of coordination costs and scrutiny, we analyzed our data to 
identify GP representatives’ and MgmtAgency managers’ interests, strategies for satisfying these 
interests, and with which practices they were associated (see Table 3). For instance, we identified 
that GPs were generally concerned with attracting financial income (in contrast to several 
MgmtAgency managers who told us that they had accepted lower wages as part of moving from 
the private sector into public health administration). However, what especially caught our 
attention was how elements of the strategic change initiative were attempting to direct 
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stakeholders’ interests towards particular practices. We consequently analyzed our data in this 
respect and identified actions that strategic change initiators took to direct interests (see Table 4). 
--- insert Table 4 about here --- 
We then engaged in efforts to “link the content, contexts, and processes of change over time 
to explain the differential achievement of change” (Pettigrew, 1990: 268). This entailed the 
compilation of an event-history database to detect potentially relevant incidents and the 
construction of a detailed narrative. This narrative guides the presentation of our analysis below 
that focuses on the strategic change initiative at MgmtAgency and links it, together with agents’ 
existing interests, to subsequent developments across the three contract management practices. 
Finally, abstracting from this particular case, and informed by resourcing theory and Bourdieu’s 
(1986) emphasis on the interplay between behavior and the distribution of highly valued 
resources7, we generated a model of resourcing across practices in strategic change. 
FINDINGS 
To understand how strategic change unfolded it is necessary to understand the pressures faced 
by MgmtAgency executives. On the one hand, they were responsible for ensuring healthcare 
services met certain regional and nationally defined quality criteria. Hospital services were 
especially scrutinized following reports concerning poor standards of quality and high mortality 
rates that received widespread media attention from 2009 onwards (Francis, 2010). On the other 
hand, the NHS faced unprecedented financial challenges. These were especially acute in the 
region studied, where MgmtAgency and local hospitals had accumulated a large amount of debt. 
Strategic Change Initiators Direct Valued Resources towards Designated Change Agents 
                                                 
7 Bourdieu refers to (potential) resources that are associated with value as ‘capitals’. 
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In September 2009 MgmtAgency hired a new executive team whose Chief Strategist 
recommended that responsibilities for contract management decisions be transferred towards 
groups of GPs in the area. GPs were perceived as being more able to reduce debt effectively (and 
hence as more powerful) than MgmtAgency managers because they had access to, and control 
over, several highly valued resources: First, they possessed medical knowledge that granted them 
authority in the field of healthcare. As one MgmtAgency manager commented: 
[Doctors] do command respect ... Politicians will throw darts at people like me but they will 
not throw darts at the doctors … [At a recent meeting with politicians the doctors] said, 'this 
is better for the patients, what do you know about it?' (MgmtAgency manager, Dec 2010) 
This authority had always been lacking at MgmtAgency because its managers did not possess 
medical qualifications. Specifically, MgmtAgency managers had backgrounds in healthcare 
administration, had worked in other sectors, and/or had social care or nursing experience in 
community care settings. The lack of medical authority had made it difficult to challenge service 
providers and alter their existing practices, even if these practices were uneconomical. 
Second, GPs regularly received feedback concerning services from their patients that 
MgmtAgency managers, who relied on standardized formal reports, might not have been aware 
of. They were also in a better position than MgmtAgency managers to find ways of replacing 
expensive services with cheaper alternatives due to their clinical knowledge. 
Third, GPs prescribed medication that was subsidized by the government and referred patients 
to public healthcare service providers for specialist treatment. This meant that GPs had a direct 
influence on the healthcare costs that MgmtAgency had to pay for its local population, especially 
because many hospital based services were reimbursed per treatment episode. 
MgmtAgency executives sought to gain access to the above mentioned resources in order to 
increase their bargaining position relative to service providers and generate favorable conditions 
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for change across the local healthcare system. MgmtAgency executives therefore defined the 
strategic change objective as transforming existing contract management practices from largely 
administrative sets of tasks performed by managers into “clinically led” activities (MgmtAgency 
strategy presentation, Dec 2009). Clinical knowledge thereby formally became a prerequisite for 
making significant decisions and hence appreciated in value. Potential resources in the form of 
formal control of (several billion pounds worth of) financial budgets for local healthcare services 
were consequently redistributed from MgmtAgency managers to local GP representatives. 
Moreover, several experienced MgmtAgency managers (i.e. human resources) were formally 
allocated to these GP representatives to provide them with contract management expertise and 
administrative support. 
Strategic Change Initiators Direct Valued Resources towards a Designated Practice  
Because MgmtAgency executives primarily associated economic pressures with hospital 
services, they directed resources towards hospital contract management. They did this in several 
ways, including (1) allocating space on the organizational agenda, (2) associating hospital 
contracts with potential gains and losses, and (3) organizational restructuring. 
In terms of allocating space on the organizational agenda, executives dedicated much of their 
own time toward negotiating with hospitals, relative to other service providers in the region. For 
instance, according to his public diary, MgmtAgency’s new Chief Strategist met 31 times with 
hospital representatives, compared to four times with members of community care and once with 
mental healthcare service providers in his first year. Additionally, contracts related to hospital 
services were discussed at internal weekly meetings first and at much greater length than those 
related to other service providers. On occasion MgmtAgency’s Director of Contracting forgot to 
request updates regarding mental healthcare services (observation notes, Sep 2012-Mar 2013). 
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Second, MgmtAgency executives focused discussions at meetings on issues related to 
hospitals. This becomes especially apparent from archived power point presentations in which 
hospital related costs were consistently singled out as the major problem for the local health 
economy (see for example Figure 2). Comments from local GPs suggest that these presentations 
were very effective in terms of highlighting hospital contract management as an issue that had to 
be dealt with urgently in order to avoid the deterioration of local services: 
I wanted to help MgmtAgency to turn around their debt … So, that was the challenge. They 
had been … doing presentations to the GPs and … I just felt I wanted to be part of the solution, 
not part of the problem anymore … I started off doing a bit of [hospital] admission avoidance 
work. (GP, interview, Feb 2012) 
--- insert Figure 2 about here --- 
Moreover, GPs were promised the ability to alter local services to suit their preferences. 
Control over healthcare budgets was thus associated with potential gains in the form of more 
locally responsive services: 
The initial reaction … was ‘why should we take on a … budget?’ However, when posed with 
the question ‘what would you do with a budget of £X million?’ this made people think and 
change their minds. (GP group meeting minutes, Oct 2009) 
As a result of successfully associating budget control with potential gains and losses, a 
number of GPs across the region expressed their interest in becoming involved. According to the 
Chief Strategist’s secretary, “GP engagement … was the biggest challenge but it actually quickly 
came around” (interview, Dec 2012). Strategy presentations at the time highlighted that the idea 
of transferring budgets to GPs ultimately resulted in a “surprising level of interest” (Jan 2010). 
Finally, as part of the formal handover of budget responsibilities to GPs, the organization was 
fundamentally restructured. Whereas previously two contract management teams had existed, 
namely one for hospital contracts and another for ‘non-acute service provider’ contracts, the new 
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structure consisted of four separate contract management teams. Each of these was headed up by 
a Director who had the name of at least one hospital in their title. One of these Directors was also 
formally responsible for managing the relationship with the largest community care service 
provider, while none of them was officially responsible for mental healthcare services. The total 
number of full-time staff assigned to the three areas was: Hospital Services = 13.1; Community 
Care = 4.6; Mental Health = 2.  
In summary, hospital contract management received a substantial amount of space on the 
organizational agenda, was directly associated with a high level of potential gains and losses of 
valued resources, and witnessed an increased number of human resources. Having outlined the 
principal elements of MgmtAgency’s strategic change initiative, we now turn to subsequent 
developments and provisional outcomes concerning hospital contract management. 
The Hospital Contract Management Practice 
The inclusion of local GPs in contract management resulted in the proliferation of new 
projects. Local GP groups’ websites mentioned that they had initiated 27 new projects related to 
hospital services. For example, several GPs across the region became involved in assessing how 
to reduce unnecessary hospital admissions. Conditions for change with regard to hospital 
contract management thus initially appeared to be favorable. 
(Un)Willingness to Challenge. However, despite formal control of financial budgets, 
possession of clinical knowledge and frontline experience, GPs’ willingness to actively monitor 
hospital performance was limited. Communication by GP representatives suggests that they were 
to some extent intimidated by the thought of having to negotiate with prestigious hospitals: 
In truth, there may not be many of us who would relish intense meetings with 
LocalTeachingHospital. (Letter from local GP committee to members, Jul 2010)  
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Notably, because they generally accepted hospital physicians’ authority, GPs at times shied away 
from attempting to persuade them to alter existing procedures: 
When you get [hospital] consultants and GPs in the room, they are falling over each other to 
be … deferential to each other. And that does … slow down decision-making … For example, 
… we have discussions about the ways in which LocalTeachingHospital is failing to deliver a 
good service ... but then, when we get to the meeting our GP lead is so desperate to show 
proper regard to this very senior [hospital] consultant … that he doesn't actually say: ‘You are 
not doing your job properly. Get it sorted out!’ … Whereas, as a manager, actually, you could 
say: ‘Look! We are expecting X number’. (MgmtAgency manager, Aug 2013) 
This reluctance to challenge hospital doctors was confirmed by a GP: 
It’s difficult, isn’t it, because you can’t ask dumb questions and you can’t challenge and you 
can’t say, ‘hang on, what’s that all about?’ (GP, interview, Sep 2013). 
In fact, one hospital representative claimed that he was in favor of having more meetings with 
GPs because they largely accepted hospital physicians’ advice rather than demanding changes: 
The GPs, when they come in front of a hospital consultant who has spent their last 20 years 
focusing on a particular specialty... It's very difficult for a GP to understand what is actually 
happening, very difficult to contribute to the discussion, and they basically rely on the 
consultant to tell them what needs to happen. (LocalTeachingHospital manager, Sep 2014) 
In sum, hospitals did not even appear to have to actively assert their dominance to block 
change. GPs, as designated change agents, refrained from using the potential resources at their 
disposal to instigate changes. They instead allowed hospital doctors to assume a central role in 
activities related to hospital contract management and to thereby maintain the status quo. 
Coordination Costs and Scrutiny. Apart from failing to substantially alter existing relations 
of power between organizations, another issue quickly became apparent: Although local GPs had 
many ideas concerning how to alter existing contractual arrangements, the implementation 
thereof was often hampered due to the difficulty of reaching agreements among themselves. 
According to one MgmtAgency manager: 
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[T]here are things that would work [in terms of] process changes which you cannot get through 
until you have convinced a clinician … and sometimes these are management and procedural 
things that actually you don't need clinical input for … And [the slow pace of decision making 
also arises] because … for some things there are simply too many decision-making bodies and 
too many groups with delegated authority. (Interview, Aug 2013) 
Technically, the establishment of four separate hospital contract management teams, each 
responsible for negotiating with one particular hospital, should have limited the need to reach 
agreements among all GP representatives across the region. However, GPs at times objected to 
any arrangements that appeared to favor one hospital over another, making it difficult to align 
their views: 
GP1: Can I just point out that we're actually treating these two [hospitals] differently – for one 
of them we are withholding money... 
GP2: …one of them [note: LocalTeachingHospital] we're withholding money and they're 
performing great. The other [note: LocalGeneralHospital] is performing badly and we're not... 
GP1: We need to be consistent... (observation notes, Oct 2012) 
Despite the lack of change, executives presented their strategic change initiative internally and 
externally as a success by emphasizing the increased participation of clinicians. However, the 
major achievements they consistently highlighted, such as a “radical transformation” of local 
services were related to mental health contract management (trade journal article draft, Sep 
2011). This is despite the fact that MgmtAgency executives initially had shown little interest in 
altering mental healthcare contracting arrangements. We now turn to developments concerning 
mental health contract management to see how and why change emerged there. 
The Mental Health Contract Management Practice 
As noted above, MgmtAgency’s strategic change initiative involved restructuring. Several 
members of the ‘non-acute’ contract management team were assigned new tasks. The remaining 
members argued successfully to the executive team that they did not possess sufficient resources 
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to manage all non-hospital related contracts. While some had gained nursing experience and 
were familiar with many aspects of community care, none had training in mental healthcare. 
The responsibility for contracts related to mental healthcare services was subsequently passed 
on to an MgmtAgency manager outside the team, who we refer to as Kate. Kate, along with a 
junior staff member, had been responsible for managing service redesign projects related to 
mental healthcare, learning disabilities, substance misuse and prison healthcare services, but had 
not been directly involved in contract management. Her lack of enthusiasm for assuming this 
additional responsibility is evident from her description of these duties as “contracting crap” 
(observation notes, Sep 2012). In sum, no-one at MgmtAgency appeared to be interested in 
mental health contract management. However, lacking experience in hospital or community care 
contract management and facing the prospect of being made redundant, Kate had little choice but 
to become responsible for this practice. 
Coordination Costs and Scrutiny. Kate attended a final monthly contract monitoring meeting 
between MgmtAgency’s non-acute contract management team and MentalHealth Provider 
representatives with five other MgmtAgency members. In the first meeting after the 
restructuring, attendance dropped to just Kate and her assistant, along with one MentalHealth 
Provider representative. Kate used the meeting to agree changes on how contract management 
was performed by “streamlining communications” between the organizations and developing 
“the most efficient agenda format for monthly meetings” (meeting minutes, Oct 2010). 
Furthermore, Kate altered contract monitoring by requesting senior MentalHealth Provider 
clinicians to attend and present updates concerning their services at future monthly meetings so 
as to discuss reasons for shortcomings. This method of discussing issues departed substantially 
from exclusively reviewing quantitative performance indicators. Kate also invited local GP 
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representatives to contract management meetings and responded to their suggestions concerning 
how to improve existing processes further. For instance, she merged historically separate 
meetings after one GP representative complained that they were “not joined up” making it 
difficult to align quality of clinical services with performance outcomes: 
It is absolutely amazing. You have performance management of the contracts here, and you 
have quality [review] over there. Huh?! (GP, interview, May 2012) 
Such issues were not unique to mental health contract management but appeared to be much 
more difficult to resolve in other service areas: 
The battle that I have had to suggest that actually that is ridiculous and they need to be joined 
up… So, then there is agreement: ‘Yes, it is ridiculous.’ And then actually translating that, so 
it is joined up… You wouldn't believe it. You go round and round and round in circles. We 
are … closer to it in mental health than we are in any other [service area]. (GP, interview, May 
2012) 
Kate acknowledged in interviews that the above mentioned changes were attempts to align 
contract management with the interests of GP representatives, who preferred to discuss specific 
service issues and spend as little time as possible in formal meetings. Moreover, by 
demonstrating that she was accommodating GPs’ interests, Kate received positive feedback from 
her “new masters” (interview, Dec 2010) and was able to secure her position within 
MgmtAgency. 
Notably, the number of MgmtAgency managers and GP representatives that became directly 
involved in mental health contract management was much lower than in other service areas. Of 
the GPs that became members of the emerging ‘GP lead mental health network’, several resigned 
during this study. In at least one case this was triggered by the decision not to reimburse the 
individual’s time spent on work related to mental health contract management because it was 
“not considered a priority” by the local GP group’s board (MgmtAgency manager, informal 
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conversation, Sep 2012). The official priority across all MgmtAgency affiliated GP groups (as 
stated on their websites) was reducing hospital admissions. It appeared that MgmtAgency’s 
executives had successfully directed both MgmtAgency managers’ and local GPs’ efforts 
towards hospital contract management – and away from mental health contract management. 
Kate and the few GP representatives who did become involved in mental health contract 
management at times lamented the lack of financial resources to support GPs’ efforts and the 
general lack of interest in this area:  
GP: [The GP in area Y] is apparently concerned that she doesn’t have enough time [to become 
a mental health representative]. 
… 
Kate: If you're gonna have GP led commissioning then you need funding! The house is going 
to fall down if we don't fund the GP leadership! 
… 
GP: The danger is you'll just be left with me; and when I expire you'll be left with no-one. 
 
(observation notes, Sep 2012) 
 
However, the general lack of interest from most MgmtAgency managers and local GP 
representatives allowed making and implementing decisions, and thus effectively using available 
(albeit limited) potential resources, without lengthy negotiations. In contrast to other service 
areas, disagreements or tensions among and between GPs representatives and MgmtAgency 
managers were rare as members were able to accommodate each other’s’ views. As one GP 
representative commented in an interview: 
We are a very tight unit … we’re sort of a perfect team … there is never any [real tension] … 
There are only really four of us … The others are really quite peripheral. (Aug 2012) 
 
In fact, we were surprised by what appeared to us as complete absence of tensions between 
GP representatives, which departed from what we were commonly told about GPs generally 
being unable to work together and reach agreements beyond small partnerships. For instance, 
one local provider manager noted: 
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You have lots of dynamics with the eight local GP groups. I don't know if you have seen it but 
it is almost like they should come together in four groups; but in each area you have two groups 
that don't particularly get on with each other. It would be funny if it wasn't that serious. 
(CommunityProvider manager, interview, Nov 2012) 
The same manager also noted that the speed of change with regard to mental health services had 
taken him by surprise: 
I [was a] representative on a group that MgmtAgency's Chief Strategist put together ... that 
was a group of Finance Directors from the [largest healthcare] providers [across the region]. 
When the GPs eventually joined our group ... it was interesting to see what themes got pushed. 
So psychiatric liaison services … suddenly was pushed through in about June; it had only been 
mentioned in passing in April. (interview, Nov 2012) 
In summary, a relatively small number of projects related to mental health contract 
management were initiated, but changes emerged quickly – changes that ultimately attracted 
MgmtAgency executives’ attention and were communicated both internally and externally to 
highlight the (partial) achievement of strategic change objectives. However, and in contrast to 
the hospital representative quoted earlier, MentalHealth Provider managers had some 
reservations about GPs’ increased involvement in contract management: 
We were slightly cautious about engaging [with GP representatives]. And I still remember 
[two GPs] wanting to straightaway get into the details about our management costs and our 
capital charges and everything else … And those were very challenging meetings; and because 
of those meetings we were slightly more cautious about, you know, taking that forward. 
(interview, Dec 2012) 
As a consequence, MentalHealth Provider managers responded to what they perceived as threats 
to their autonomy. These responses tested GP representatives’ willingness to challenge the status 
quo, as we elaborate below.  
(Un)Willingness to Challenge. As noted above, none of the members of MgmtAgency’s non-
acute contract management team had any direct experience in mental healthcare services. 
Moreover, in contrast to hospitals, MentalHealth Provider only employed one group of medical 
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doctors, namely psychiatrists. Congruent with the literature (e.g. Calnan & Gabe, 1991), we 
identified a more balanced relationship between GPs and mental health clinicians than between 
GPs and hospital consultants. For instance, GP representatives at times did not hesitate to use an 
assertive tone and demand changes. In the following observation notes, not only is this 
assertiveness evident, but also the GP’s concern to accommodate the views of other colleagues to 
whom he needs to ‘sell this service’: 
MentalHealth Provider manager X gives an update on the new service … Two of the GP 
representatives frequently interrupt with questions … One GP notes: “I cannot sell this service 
to my colleagues.” … Kate’s assistant highlights to meeting attendees the large amount of 
work that staff at MentalHealth Provider have contributed … He tells me after the meeting 
that MentalHealth Provider manager X looked very stressed and that it is a shame that GPs 
kept cutting him off instead of letting him speak. (Mar 2012) 
MentalHealth Provider managers responded to this situation by involving their most senior 
psychiatrists (i.e. those individuals who they believed controlled resources in the form of 
knowledge that was valued most highly by GPs) in contract negotiations, partly in an attempt to 
deflect from issues such as management costs and “steer it more towards the clinical”: 
Essentially … our organization put the Clinical Directors forward as, not as pawns, but kind 
of … So, our organization in a way used us, well, not used us, but put us forward to negotiate 
with GPs. (MentalHealth Provider clinician, interview, Nov 2012) 
MentalHealth clinicians, meanwhile, recognized that by becoming more involved in contract 
related discussions they could potentially influence the distribution of funding and raise their 
profile within their organization, or at least counteract such attempts by other divisions: 
[M]embership of that core group [consisting of the GP network, MgmtAgency and 
MentalHealth Provider representatives] … enables the membership and influence in other 
areas [and] jockeying, not just for [financial investments], but for time on the agenda. 
(MentalHealth Provider clinician, interview, Dec 2012) 
Senior mental health clinicians therefore regularly attended meetings and shared detailed 
information concerning services formally, as well as informally “in the car park” (MentalHealth 
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Provider clinician, interview, Nov 2012). As a consequence, mental health contract management 
was being transformed from a largely administrative set of tasks performed by managers towards 
frequent, regular, sustained and coordinated ‘clinically led’ activities. 
One important question remains, however: If the strategic change initiative was so successful 
in directing interests towards hospital contract management, thereby limiting coordination costs 
and scrutiny in other practices, then why did the most favorable conditions for using resources to 
implement change emerge in mental health rather than, for instance, in community care contract 
management? Notably, as we elaborate below, existing relations of power were altered to a much 
greater extent in the latter, resulting in a high level of willingness to challenge incumbents and 
the status quo, and yet change was not forthcoming. This suggests that conditions for change 
were rather different across these practices. We elucidate these below to conclude our 
presentation of the findings.  
The Community Care Contract Management Practice 
As already noted, the non-acute contract management team shrank as managers were 
redeployed to support the strategic change initiative. However, because all mental health contract 
management responsibilities were shifted to Kate, the total number of managers responsible for 
community care did not actually decrease significantly: The new community care contract 
management team consisted of over four full-time equivalent members, compared to seven of the 
former team (that had had the larger remit of covering all non-hospital based services). 
As also noted above, many of MgmtAgency’s managers were trained nurses or social workers 
with experience in community care. This resulted in a relationship between MgmtAgency and 
CommunityProvider that was quite equally balanced because both had access to in-depth 
knowledge concerning services and occupied similar positions in healthcare’s social hierarchy. 
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(Un)Willingness to Challenge. The balance of power shifted considerably when GPs 
formally assumed MgmtAgency’s contract management responsibilities: GPs not only had 
extensive experience in community care but, as noted earlier, also had medical qualifications that 
provided authority. As one GP representative commented: 
Secondary care [i.e. hospitals] is at the top, commissioners [i.e. healthcare management 
organizations] are underneath, because even though we should be above secondary care we 
are not, but community services are right at the bottom. So those are the ones you can really 
kick at. (interview, Nov 2012) 
This was confirmed by a CommunityProvider manager (and former nurse) who stated that 
“community nurses … always bow down to GPs” (interview, Aug 2013). 
In stark contrast to the service areas described above, GPs did not hesitate to challenge 
CommunityProvider clinicians in meetings. In fact, they at times even criticized them publicly: 
Some of our senior staff, our clinical staff, were in a forum with GPs the other day and … GP 
leaders [were] at the front badmouthing what we were doing. Our staff were [just] sitting there. 
(CommunityProvider manager, interview, Jul 2013). 
It thus appeared that MgmtAgency now had access to sufficient resources (in the form of GPs’ 
authoritative medical knowledge) and willingness to challenge incumbents to fundamentally alter 
community care contract management and existing services in the region. 
Coordination Costs and Scrutiny 
However, attempts to make changes – such as simply streamlining existing monitoring 
meetings – regularly failed. According to one GP representative, a major issue was the 
involvement of experienced MgmtAgency managers who tended to rely on existing procedures: 
They were really the old-school contract management. All the meetings we were going to [that 
were related to] contract management and so-called “quality” [were] a complete tick box 
exercise and didn't mean anything … And thus it has continued. I just couldn't cope with it 
anymore. (interview, Nov 2012) 
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Meanwhile, the same GP, along with other GP representatives and MgmtAgency managers, 
noted that the greatest difficulty resulted from incompatible interests among GPs across the 
region. Notably, GPs were, to varying degrees, directly invested in community care services: 
GPs regularly relied on community care services due to an ageing and thus increasingly 
housebound population. Several GPs also provided certain community based services themselves 
that extended beyond traditional general practice. Specifically, 76 GPs in the region officially 
declared a ‘special interest’ in particular community based services. Their interest also became 
apparent in a meeting on the provision of annual flu jabs in the community, which ended when a 
GP reminded his colleagues that “we all make money on flu jabs” (observation notes, Sep 2012). 
In summary, many MgmtAgency managers and GPs were highly invested in practices related 
to community care contract management. In the case of MgmtAgency managers with community 
care experience, this was their sole area of clinical expertise: A move to another service area 
(such as hospital or mental health contract management) would result in the inability to use this 
resource. They therefore had an interest in remaining involved and exerting influence. Similarly, 
GPs felt that they had much to gain from becoming involved and much to lose if they did not: 
[GPs] are desperate to have better community services … So, yes they want to make a lot of 
noise about it, but kind of understandably, actually, [because] it causes us potentially the most 
grief. (GP, interview, Sep 2014) 
As a result, the strategic change initiative, which focused on hospital contract management, 
did not direct agents’ interests away from community care contract management. This resulted in 
a relatively large number of agents monitoring and attempting to influence developments in the 
latter which naturally incurred substantial coordination costs. Attempts to introduce change 
concerning community care contract management thus required extensive negotiation. Favorable 
conditions for using potential resources to implement change therefore failed to emerge there. 
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RESOURCING ACROSS PRACTICES IN STRATEGIC CHANGE 
On the basis of our analysis we develop an understanding of the emergence of change in 
unexpected places. To do so, we elaborate a model of resourcing across practices in strategic 
change (see Figure 3). This model consists of three interrelated sub-processes (labeled A, B and 
C, respectively) that link the emergence of (un)favorable conditions for change across practices 
during strategic change.  
--- insert Figure 3 about here --- 
Sub-Process A: Strategic change initiatives direct agents’ interests by triggering 
revaluations and redistributions of potential resources 
As we show in the box at the left of Figure 3, the first sub-process entails the possible 
revaluing and redistributing of potential resources. This involves attempts by strategic change 
initiators to (1) prioritize targeted practices and to (2) ensure that change agents are in control of 
sufficient resources to implement changes therein. 
Practices are prioritized by associating them with valued resources, thereby effectively selling 
them as issues that demand attention (cf. Dutton, Ashford, O’Neill, & Lawrence, 2001; Howard-
Grenville, 2007). This may entail shifting staff, budgets, space on the organizational agenda, and 
other potential resources towards them (and thereby away from others). 
Certain designated agents, meanwhile, are formally granted a degree of control over particular 
organizational decisions. Their authority stems from being associated with particular potential 
resources, such as certain types of specialized knowledge. In our case, GPs formally gained 
control over financial budgets because medical knowledge appreciated in value by becoming a 
prerequisite for making many decisions related to healthcare contract management at 
  32 
 
 
 
MgmtAgency. In other cases of strategic change, lawyers or management consultants may gain 
control based on their recognized access to particular forms of knowledge. 
Importantly, our model highlights via the circular arrows in the first box that these processes 
of revaluing and redistributing potential resources are ongoing, recursive, and not completely 
controllable by strategic change initiators. Members of the organization, including designated 
change agents, enact the distribution of valued resources and may associate certain practices and 
agents with valued resources in addition to (or instead of) those that strategic change initiatives 
have prioritized. This is because organizations do not start with a blank slate: Agents are 
predisposed to associating particular resources with value as a result of socialization experiences 
(Bourdieu, 1985a). Our case vividly demonstrates this enactment and strategic change initiators’ 
lack of control over the process: Once GPs were responsible for healthcare budget decisions the 
value of medical knowledge in contract management appreciated yet further as they valued this 
potential resource particularly highly. Consequently, this made it difficult for anyone without 
control of this potential resource – including MgmtAgency managers – to influence practices and 
implement change. Similar dynamics have been documented in other settings, such as the 
inability to direct efforts towards sales and marketing if research and development activities are 
valued much more highly by organization members (Nag, Corley, & Gioia, 2007). It follows that 
strategic change initiatives act as potential triggers for resource revaluations and redistributions 
but that they may not fully succeed in directing interests and shifting power relations according 
to plan.   
As the circles with the many dots at the top in Figure 3 suggest, certain practices, and not 
necessarily (only) those that are initially prioritized as part of strategic change initiatives, 
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consequently attract interest from a relatively large number of individuals. Meanwhile, as 
depicted by the circles at the bottom that contain few dots, other practices do not. 
Sub-Process B: The distribution of interests shapes coordination costs and scrutiny across 
practices 
The arrows labeled ‘B’ in Figure 3 suggest that the (uneven) distribution of interests across 
practices tends to generate a corresponding (unequal) distribution of coordination costs and 
scrutiny. Practices that attract interest from a large number of individuals witness more attempts 
to influence them, especially if many individuals become directly engaged in them. Direct 
engagement is likely to be especially high in practices that are prioritized by change initiators 
and designated change agents. This is because these practices generally witness an increase of 
staffing levels and because their future becomes the subject of debate among a wider audience. 
Effectively excluding individuals from these practices can be difficult to justify, especially in 
modern times of increasing transparency and ‘open strategy’ in contexts beyond the public sector 
(Whittington, Cailluet, & Yakis-Douglas, 2011). Both coordination costs and scrutiny associated 
with these ‘interesting’ practices are consequently high. This is highlighted by the dark shading 
of the top circles in our diagram. 
In our case, developments with regard to hospital contract management were closely 
scrutinized by MgmtAgency executives, while developments concerning community care 
contracts attracted much attention from local GP representatives and several managers. The 
relatively large number of change proposals that local GPs devised with regard to these two 
service areas naturally required coordination. Thus coordination costs and scrutiny can influence 
resourcing actions both across one’s own peer group (e.g. colleague GPs) and from seniors in 
formal authority (e.g. MgmtAgency executive) (Dutton et al 2001; Howard Grenville 2007). 
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On the other hand, practices that attract only very limited interest fail to generate efforts from 
many individuals to actively influence them. Expending much time and effort in these practices 
is generally not viewed as worth it. Hence, potential change agents may disengage from these 
practices, either by limiting their active involvement, or by exiting them altogether. In our case 
this was most evident when MgmtAgency’s ‘out of hospital’ contract team members handed 
over mental health contract management responsibilities to others.  
Sub-Process C: Coordination costs, scrutiny and change agents’ (un)willingness to 
challenge shape the negotiation and implementation of changes across practices 
As the arrow directly under the label ‘C’ suggests, the level of coordination costs and scrutiny 
associated with each practice shapes the ability to implement changes therein. For instance, the 
need to coordinate efforts among, and get ‘buy-in’ from, a relatively large number of strongly 
interested individuals, including peers, inhibits rapid decision making (Goodstein, Gautam, & 
Boeker, 1994; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Negotiations concerning proposed changes may be 
difficult and stall as interests across the multiple stakeholders become difficult to align. This was 
most apparent in our case with regard to community care contract management and is also 
commonly noted in the strategic change literature in the form of ‘escalating indecision’ (Denis, 
Dompierre, Langley, & Rouleau, 2010) and ‘dilemmas of participation’ (Kanter, 1996), 
especially in public sector contexts (Brunsson, 1985). 
Meanwhile, implementing changes in practices that exhibit a low degree of coordination costs 
and scrutiny is less difficult, provided that, as depicted by the other arrow coming up from 
below, there are change agents who are willing to challenge incumbents and the status quo. The 
limited availability of ‘traditional’ resources, such as budgets and staff is thereby offset by a 
relatively low level of interference (cf. Tushman & O’Reilly, 1999). Furthermore, change agents’ 
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willingness to challenge is shaped by their (not necessarily conscious) assessments of who 
controls potential resources that they particularly value (cf. Lockett et al., 2014). Strategic 
change initiatives play an important role in shaping this willingness by setting in motion resource 
redistributions and revaluations. Importantly, despite formally controlling certain potential 
resources such as budgets or strategic decision making authority, designated change agents may 
rely on the advice of others who they associate with (other) valued resources.   
In our case, GPs especially valued specialized medical knowledge and being part of the 
medical community. Consequently, GPs representatives, as designated change agents, defined 
medical knowledge as valuable in the context of contract management and associated specialized 
hospital doctors with highly valued resources. GP representatives were not comfortable 
challenging the latter in contrast to agents who they did not associate with high status medical 
knowledge. Thus, strategic change initiatives may trigger developments that ultimately increase 
the influence of certain agents apart from, or beyond, those who are initially granted formal 
(designated) control over potential resources.  
In other settings newly hired change agents, such as ‘outsider’ CEOs, may value fresh 
perspectives and therefore allow members who are relatively new to the firm or industry to 
influence important organizational decisions (cf. Fondas & Wiersema, 1997). Alternatively, they 
may value organization members’ experience very highly and therefore grant particularly 
experienced members a high degree of organizational influence. Our model therefore 
incorporates the possibility that strategic change initiatives reinforce and reproduce existing 
relations of power as a result of change agents valuing those resources that are controlled by 
historically dominant stakeholders (cf. Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990).   
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We refer to the favorable conditions for change that are related to agents’ interests and the 
values they associate with potential resources as providing ‘resourcing space’: an emergent space 
that allows for mutual adjustment and accommodation so as to enable and direct actions. As we 
have shown, strategic change initiatives may (intentionally and unintentionally) both enable and 
constrain the development of resourcing space as a result of simultaneously providing and 
withdrawing (i.e. redistributing) potential resources, as well as setting in motion the appreciation 
and devaluation of certain potential resources, within a field of practices. 
Naturally, change may emerge in practices that exhibit different conditions. However, the 
negotiation and eventual implementation of profound changes therein is likely to be more 
difficult because they require an abundance of skill in terms of overcoming or circumventing 
potential blockages (such as in the form of additional bureaucracy and/or active opposition to 
change proposals), and ultimately simply demand more time. 
Finally, as the dotted feedback line at the bottom of Figure 3 suggests, developments in and 
across practices may feed back into strategic change initiatives, potentially triggering further 
attempts to redistribute or revalue potential resources. For instance, failure to achieve change in 
particular practices may generate attempts to allocate more financial or human resources towards 
them or further emphasize their strategic importance, thereby increasing their symbolic value. 
Successful change in a practice may, in turn, trigger attempts to replicate developments in other 
practices by transferring potential resources, such as knowledge, across practices. Such was the 
case with the mental health contract management practice in our study, which was highlighted by 
MgmtAgency executives as a success story and which was regarded as a source of learning for 
the community care contract management team and GP representatives.  
DISCUSSION 
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In this paper we have developed a resourcing lens to analyze divergent and unexpected 
developments across contract management practices for hospitals, mental health, and community 
care following the initiation of a strategic change attempt within the English NHS. Our study 
allows us to elaborate theory as to the role of valued resources in strategic change and, in so 
doing, furthers our understanding of a resourcing perspective. Below we describe how our 
findings contribute to strategic change and resourcing literature streams and develop the concept 
of resourcing space as an important elaboration of the resourcing process in strategic change. 
Contributions to Research on Resources in Strategic Change 
Studies have highlighted that the emergence of profound change is often associated with a 
shift in control of valuable resources towards agents who have not traditionally occupied 
dominant positions within in an organization or wider field (e.g. Battilana, 2011; Kellogg, 2009; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). By gaining control, agents who are not wedded to existing 
arrangements have the opportunity to shape practices according to their own interests. This paper 
extends this insight in a fundamental way by highlighting the role of strategic change initiatives 
in shaping what is, and what is not, considered valuable. Hence, we argue for shifting our 
thinking away from a consideration of the role of resources in shaping strategic change towards 
examining the role of strategic change initiatives in shaping resources. Importantly, rather than 
merely allocating potential resources across an organization, strategic change initiatives also play 
an active role in shaping the values that are associated with potential resources, such as by 
prioritizing certain issues and solutions over others (cf. Howard-Grenville, 2007). As our 
findings demonstrate, this can trigger dynamics that can contribute to both intended and 
unintended outcomes. 
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Such a reconceptualization of the relationships between strategic change and resources 
emphasizes the agency of strategic change initiators and change agents – not just in terms of 
using potential resources but also in constructing the values they are associated with. This 
highlights that values are not externally determined, thereby limiting the ability to predict 
developments on the basis of the initial distribution of potential resources alone (Kraatz & Zajac, 
2001). This is because potential resources can appreciate and decline in value, thereby shaping 
power relations and attracting different levels of interest that can enable and constrain change. In 
other words – and departing from resource dependence theory explanations (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
2003) – just because an organization is, for instance, facing increased litigation threats does not 
mean that its lawyers will automatically become more powerful and align existing organizational 
practices with their own interests. Although such an outcome is conceivable, executives and 
other stakeholders who are associated with valued resources may respond differently (depending 
on their own interests). For example, in the case presented in this paper MgmtAgency executives 
could have prioritized non-acute providers and non-clinical forms of knowledge, setting in 
motion developments across contract management practices that potentially would have departed 
substantially from those that we observed. 
Such a perspective also differs from more traditional conceptualizations of values and 
interests in the organization literature. For instance, while interests have been conceived as 
related to agents’ “view of the appropriate allocation of scarce resources” (Ranson, Hinings, & 
Greenwood, 1980: 6), agents’ values have often been treated as distinct from interests and not 
tied explicitly to potential resources (e.g. Cha & Edmondson, 2006; Hinings, Thibault, Slack, & 
Kikulis, 1996). Drawing on Bourdieu’s relational framework, we consider values as forming an 
essential part of the relations between agents and potential resources, which in turn shape 
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interests, as well as their willingness to challenge others. Thus, resource value is not fixed or 
predetermined but varies for each agent, depending on their existing interests that are shaped by 
socialization experiences (including strategic change initiatives) and investments in wider fields 
of inter-connected practices (Bourdieu, 1986, 1990). 
Contributions to Research on Resourcing  
Our findings also contribute to the literature on resourcing in two important ways. First, a 
resourcing perspective divides all things into potential resources and resources-in-use (Feldman 
& Orlikowski, 2011: 1246; Feldman & Worline, 2012: 630). Use is shaped by a potential 
resource’s innate qualities, agents’ associations of meaning with practices, and skills (Feldman, 
2004; Feldman & Worline, 2012; Sonenshein, 2014). Our case suggests that a focus on direct use 
limits the ability to recognize how potential resources may shape behavior and relations in other 
ways that can be important in understanding how and why change may (not) emerge. 
We highlight that the value agents associate with potential resources plays an important role 
in terms of shaping their willingness to associate themselves with them, appropriate them, 
challenge others, and participate in certain practices. Thus, taking into account the value that 
agents attribute to potential resources extends resourcing theory by providing an enhanced 
understanding of how, when and why agents use resources. From this perspective, potential 
resources are not only tools that agents can use to pursue their interests but, depending on 
associated value, entities that may attract interest. 
Attention to values and interests in terms of shaping behavior does not rule out the possibility 
of agents experimenting with potential resources and only recognizing their value during or after 
processes of improvisation (cf. Barrett, 1998; Chia & Holt, 2011; Sonenshein, 2014). However, 
it highlights that agents are primarily drawn to those things they value highly, either because they 
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are personally dependent on, or familiar with them (as per the GPs’ interest in community care), 
or because they are deemed valuable in the wider field (such as medical knowledge in the field 
of healthcare). As we have shown, strategic change initiatives and change agents’ internalized 
values may strongly direct resourcing as well as with whom they may cooperate or be willing to 
challenge. This perspective furthers our understanding of how power can be channeled (or not) 
to resource the ability for new approaches to be implemented (Lockett et al., 2014; Reay, 
Golden-Biddle, & Germann, 2006). It also highlights that while skill is undeniably important in 
terms of being able to effectively resource, the skills required to implement change within a 
practice are partly shaped by the level of interest the available potential resources attract, as well 
as change agents’ associations of themselves and others with valued resources. 
Second, the resourcing literature has tended to examine practices individually rather than 
relations between them (e.g. Feldman, 2004; Howard-Grenville, 2007; Sonenshein, 2014). The 
focus on dynamics within individual practices has resulted in an enhanced understanding of how 
potential resources are transformed rather than assuming that the provision of certain potential 
resources produces specific outcomes (Feldman & Worline, 2012). However, our findings show 
that potential resources (such as staff) may also be shifted across practices. Our analysis suggests 
that, like organizations and organizational divisions, practices compete for scarce resources 
within a field and should therefore not be treated in isolation. Those practices that do not 
accumulate valued potential resources witness relatively little engagement from the majority of 
agents within the wider field. By examining redistributions and revaluations our model sensitizes 
us to the fact that the provision of potential resources equates to a relative withdrawal elsewhere 
and that the appreciation of certain potential resources has consequences for other potential 
resources. Hence, our model encourages the adoption of a relational view of practices as 
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embedded within a wider field (Emirbayer & Johnson, 2008) that captures developments beyond 
practices that are specifically targeted as part of strategic change initiatives. 
Several scholars have in the past highlighted that organizations are relational systems and that 
subunits, divisions or practices both share and compete for scarce resources (Hickson, Hinings, 
Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Walsh et al., 1981). The 
prioritization of one part of an organization may therefore trigger politically motivated responses 
from other parts (Mintzberg, 1985; Pettigrew, 1973; Pfeffer, 1993). We show that this 
competition need not take the form of explicit power struggles and political behavior. As per 
Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1985b; 1990), disadvantaged agents may know their place rather than 
engage in active resistance. This was, for instance, especially apparent in our case from the 
behavior of community nursing staff and MgmtAgency managers in terms of accepting medical 
doctors’ authority in healthcare contract management. Interestingly, our findings indicate that 
agents who participate in practices that witness a decline of valued resources, and hence ‘lose 
out’ to others (Buchanan & Badham, 1999), may paradoxically also ‘win’ by gaining the ability 
to shape these de-prioritized practices according to their own interests. 
Resourcing Space 
Our findings further suggest that space is an important and productive aspect of relations of 
power in resourcing strategic change. Social movement literature has shown the importance of 
free space in enabling subordinate groups to develop the capacity to engage in political 
challenges (Rao & Dutta, 2012). Within these spaces reform agents are shielded from 
interference from defenders of the status quo (Kellogg, 2009), allowing them to engage in 
mobilization as they collectively gain a sense of oppositional efficacy and identity (Fantasia & 
Hirsch, 1995). Our research shows how resource (re)valuations and (re)distributions may 
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(unintentionally) contribute towards such openings by creating what we term ‘resourcing space’, 
which we define as an emergent space which allows for mutual adjustment and accommodation 
so as to enable and direct action. Rather than space being an independent condition that 
facilitates change implementation (Kellogg, 2009; Rao & Dutta, 2012), we find that such 
resourcing space may emerge as strategic change unfolds, with the space itself functioning as a 
potential resource that enables mobilization and experimentation. Hence, analogous to the 
resourcing perspective that argues that resources are not given but enacted in ways that may 
produce unexpected results (Feldman, 2004), we find that resourcing space can be generated as 
an unintended by-product of purposive actions. 
While earlier work on free space focuses on mobilization (Rao & Dutta, 2012) or relational 
aspects of inclusion (Kellogg, 2009), our understanding of a resourcing space builds on work 
(Feldman & Worline, 2012) that emphasizes the central role of action in generating the value of 
resources and how mutual adjustment within an emerging context shapes resource use. 
Specifically, Feldman and Worline (2012) suggest that mutual adjustment, as a mechanism for 
resourcing, involves agents evaluating and comparing relevant knowledge to shape resource use. 
In this way resourcing space enables interdependent actors to modify their individual responses 
as they interact with each other so that efforts in reshaping the practice become coordinated and 
aligned (Barnes, 2001). Our analysis of mental health contract management shows that where 
actors are motivated to mutually adjust their practice so as to accommodate the interests of 
others, negotiation of resource use and collective action are empowered (cf. Oborn, Barrett, & 
Davidson, 2011). Moreover, as our findings highlight, this accommodation of interests may 
emerge over time as a result of individuals pursuing their own interests – such as the increased 
amount of clinical discussions being shaped by Kate attempting to secure her job and 
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MentalHealth clinicians ‘jockeying’ for time on the agenda – rather than result from explicit 
negotiation between stakeholders (cf. Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012). 
Resourcing space provides favorable conditions for mutual adjustment by (1) limiting 
coordination costs among change agents, (2) granting them the willingness to challenge the 
status quo and (3) limiting scrutiny from powerful stakeholders (including peers). We discuss 
each of these points below.  
First our model reveals the role of coordination costs in enabling action. High coordination 
costs hinder mutual adjustment. In a congested space where a large number of agents are 
involved in producing action, accommodation and adjustment may be hindered due to the need 
to negotiate many potentially divergent interests. This inhibits effective resource use. Even in 
contexts where a stakeholder group controls a much larger quantity of valued resources than 
another, such as in the case of GP representatives relative to community care workers, high 
coordination costs may stymie the capacity to act (Brunsson, 1985; Denis et al., 2010). This is 
because control may be spread out across multiple agents with competing interests, thereby 
making it difficult to achieve a common understanding (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009) and 
inhibiting the development of the microprocesses that constitute effective coordinating  
(Jarzabkowski, Lê, & Feldman, 2011). Hence, change may fail to emerge even when ‘reformers’ 
substantially outnumber ‘defenders’ of the status quo (cf. Kellogg, 2009). 
Second, our model also emphasizes the importance of willingness to challenge as to how the 
resourcing space enables change emergence. As our findings highlight in the case of hospital 
contract management, potential resources may lay idle if change agents are unwilling to use them 
in ways that could upset the established social hierarchy (cf. Lockett et al., 2014). Hence, 
historically dominant agents may not even need to actively defend the status quo, such as by 
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engaging in tactics to undermine change attempts (Kellogg, 2012). Designated change agents 
may thereby (unwittingly) hinder the formation of resourcing space themselves. This 
demonstrates the value of taking into account relatively subtle and invisible aspects of power 
relations in the context of change initiatives (Oakes, Townley, & Cooper, 1998) that go beyond 
clashes between reformers and defenders. 
Third, when agents are able to remain “in the shadows” (Dutton et al., 2001: 729) or “shielded 
from inspection” (Smets et al., 2012: 890) rapid and potentially radical change may emerge due 
to a lack of scrutiny. In contrast to conventional views of free space, there may not be any need 
to secretly mobilize (Cress & Snow, 1996) and operate ‘below the radar’ (Reay et al., 2006: 
994). Change agents do not necessarily need to be protected from potential interference, for 
instance by intentionally separating them from the rest of the organization (Andriopoulos & 
Lewis, 2009; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1999). Instead, space for resourcing may simply arise from 
the lack of interest and engagement associated with the practice. This may help establish mutual 
adjustment, especially in contexts of trust and accommodation (Rao & Dutta, 2012), thereby 
allowing for experimentation and new forms of resourcing.   
Practical Implications, Limitations and Future Research 
A number of practical implications emerge from our study. Our view of resourcing in 
strategic change allows us to uncover why strategic change initiatives may fail or succeed: On 
the one hand they may fail to induce change by unsuccessfully altering existing relations of 
power and/or by attracting such a high degree of interest that can result in high coordination 
costs and scrutiny. On the other hand, they may succeed by (unintentionally) providing space for 
experimentation in practices not associated with highly valued resources. The latter has 
implications for agents who may feel neglected and disempowered when the practices they 
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participate in are faced with a relative withdrawal of traditional resources, such as financial 
capital and personnel, during strategic change. These organization members can benefit if they 
are able to perceive the resulting space as a potential resource that they can use to their 
advantage. It also has implications for strategic change initiators who may benefit from being 
aware of the ripple effects their initiatives may trigger across an organization (and beyond).  
While we believe that our model of resourcing across practices in strategic change is 
applicable to a range of settings, our case is undoubtedly extreme in several respects, warranting 
the specification of boundary conditions. First of all, the significant changes that emerged in 
mental health contract management and that eventually caught the attention of MgmtAgency 
executives did not rely on large financial investment. These changes were thus limited to 
relatively small scale, bottom up creative changes (Sonenshein, 2014). Nevertheless, 
developments that are later recognized as dramatic “macro changes” may originate from small 
initiatives that gain momentum (Kanter, 1996: 18; Plowman et al., 2007; Smets et al., 2012). 
Second, the involvement of a relatively large number of individuals and groups in terms of 
shaping strategic change, and the lack of a clearly accepted hierarchy among them, are features 
that may predominate in pluralistic and public contexts. Not every strategic change initiative 
involves the opening of strategy (cf. Whittington et al., 2011) to individuals or groups who have 
the ability to pursue their own interests. In other settings participation may be more effectively 
restricted, thereby limiting coordination costs. It may also be more difficult for organization 
members to direct their participation primarily towards those practices they are personally 
interested in, but which are not necessarily aligned with strategic change objectives. However, 
we believe that the general implications of our model still hold, namely that strategic change 
initiatives inevitably involve some form of re-prioritization, which results in some part(s) of the 
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organization simultaneously witnessing a relative decline of perceived value. The resulting lack 
of interest has the potential to generate a vacuum which can be used by skilled agents to 
implement change without the need to engage in extensive negotiation and coordination efforts. 
In fact, the ability to introduce change in practices that (initially) attract little interest is well 
documented across the popular and academic management literature (e.g. Reay et al., 2006; 
Smets et al., 2012). For instance, organizations are known to stimulate innovation via the 
creation of skunk works – units that receive only limited funding and are purposefully isolated so 
as to limit interference (Peters & Waterman, 2004; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1999). 
Finally, not every strategic initiative includes attempts to transfer budget control towards 
members of a particular occupational group. However, strategic changes often involve a shift of 
control over an organization’s potential resources across organizational subunits or divisions 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996; Hickson et al., 1971), and these subunits are often directly 
associated with particular occupational groups (such as lawyers, accountants or engineers). 
Our study has some key limitations. For instance, despite the use of multiple data sources we 
cannot rule out all alternative explanations for the dynamics that we identified. Moreover, some 
parts of our analysis rely on data not captured in real time. Finally, although we have used intra-
case comparisons, the use of a single case study necessarily limits the ability to generalize from 
our findings. Since studies of strategic change generally examine developments in those areas of 
the organization that are considered change priorities we call for more research that investigates 
the dynamics across practices, including those that do not feature prominently on the executive 
agenda. This will provide an enhanced understanding of the complex dynamics triggered by 
strategic change initiatives and how change may emerge in unexpected places. 
Conclusion 
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Our model of resourcing across practices in strategic change provides an in-depth 
understanding of relationships between strategic change initiatives, resources, and changes 
across organizational practices. It demonstrates that change is linked to processes of resource 
redistributions and revaluations that may both facilitate and inhibit effective mutual adjustment 
and accommodation so as to enable and direct action. These insights provide an enhanced 
appreciation of how strategic change initiatives may contribute towards developments that 
extend beyond successfully changing, or failing to change, practices that are explicitly targeted. 
They thereby help us understand how and why change can emerge in unexpected places. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1a: Comparison of Contract Management Practices before Strategic Change Initiatives 
 Hospital Contract Management Mental Health Contract Management Community Care Contract Management 
Evidence of lack of clinical participation Jul 2009 - Sep 2010   
Attendance at contract 
management meetings by 
practicing clinicians (sources: 
Official contract management 
meeting minutes, CVs) 
MgmtAgency = 2 meetings (1 local GP 
attended two meetings) 
MgmtAgency = 0 meetings (Provider account 
manager had some nursing experience) 
MgmtAgency = 0 meetings (1 MgmtAgency 
manager who was not a practicing clinician but 
had some nursing experience attended regularly; 
2 CommunityProvider nurses attended 3 
meetings) 
GP involvement in contract 
management (source: 
Interviews) 
Very limited: 
 
"I was vaguely horrified that you could be 
commissioning services on such a huge scale 
without clinical input ... The managers here are 
very good, there’s some excellent people, and 
they have spent their life contracting medical 
services. Hats off to them. But they’ve never 
seen that service work and they don’t know 
what the pitfalls of it are." (GP, interview, Sep 
2013) 
Very limited:  
 
"What will the GPs realistically do? ... They’re 
saying to us: 'We will need people like you to do 
the … contracting.' ... They’re not going to sit in 
three-hour contract meetings" (MgmtAgency 
manager, interview, Dec 2010). 
Very limited:  
 
"I had very few conversations with the GPs from 
a contractual business development point of 
view … Contact with them was quite limited, 
historically" (CommunityProvider manager, 
interview, Aug 2013). 
 
"You need that clinical input [but GPs have had] 
a limited role [in managing the healthcare 
system and] a limited understanding of 
contracting processes" (MgmtAgency manager, 
interview, Oct 2012). 
Involvement of clinicians in 
managing the healthcare 
system (source: documents) 
"Our existing system is too far removed from clinicians on the ground who make decisions every day about the treatment individuals receive, in particular 
GPs. This means there is a disconnect between clinical and financial responsibility, and that the group that probably knows most about patient needs – 
GPs – are not fully involved" (MgmtAgency strategy document, Dec 2009). 
 
"[Historic] attempts by MgmtAgency to engage GPs in actively managing budgets have had some success but not sufficient to achieve the needs of 
MgmtAgency. The costs associated with this engagement are not insubstantial and there is no clear return on this investment" (letter from GP 
representative to MgmtAgency, Nov 2009). 
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Table 1b: Comparison of Contract Management Practices after Strategic Change Initiatives 
 Hospital Contract Management Mental Health Contract Management Community Care Contract Management 
Evidence of change (or lack thereof) Oct 2010 - Mar 2013   
Involvement of 
clinicians and change 
(source: interviews) 
"It has been easier for the [community and 
mental health services] to get GP 
engagement than the acute [hospitals]" 
(MgmtAgency manager, interview, Dec 
2012). 
 
LocalTeachingHospital account manager 
notes that he has been trying to increase 
the frequency of the clinical forum to 
monthly meetings but apparently there is 
some resistance from GPs (informal 
conversation notes, Sep 2014). 
"The amount of meeting time that has gone on between 
MentalHealth Provider and GPs … has been phenomenal 
[It has changed from only having] these contract 
monitoring meetings where we just sit there and talk 
about [levels of treatment] activity" (GP, interview, Feb 
2012).  
 
"[The GPs] bring a level of rigor to the discussion that I 
don't think we would necessarily have had before, 
because we have moved down to a micro-level of 
management" (MentalHealth Provider manager, 
interview, Aug 2012). 
"Personally, I haven't seen any real changes. My 
involvement has been limited to having pre-emptive 
discussions with [a couple of GP groups] about 
where they see one service going. And we haven't 
really engaged with [other GPs]" 
(CommunityProvider manager, interview, Aug 2012). 
 
"[The chair of our GP community care group] 
basically got pissed off with the whole thing and 
resigned ... and it went into hiatus for a few months 
and then we started up again, slightly lower key and 
more as a sort of information sharing group" (GP, 
interview, Oct 2012). 
Mentions of successful 
change related to 
service areas (source: 
documents, 
observation) 
Continued frustration about not being able 
to reduce hospital expenses at contract 
overview meetings (observation notes and 
meeting minutes, Sep 2012 - Mar 2013); 
Example: 
MgmtAgency manager A: We've got a £Xm 
cost pressure on the 
[LocalGeneralHospital] contract. That's a 
serious issue - what's causing it? 
MgmtAgency manager B: We've had lots of 
explanations about why they’re not being 
able to deliver their cost improvement 
plans... but I absolutely agree. 
… 
MgmtAgency manager D: It is really 
disappointing. 
(contract overview meeting observation 
notes, Mar 2013) 
 
Success stories are limited to “progressing 
development of integrated care” and 
“dermatology re-design” (external 
presentations, Jul and Sep 2012). 
"By encouraging senior clinicians to work together we 
have been able to set out plans for a radical 
transformation of mental health services ... Following 
the success of this model ... MgmtAgency and local GP 
representatives have agreed to adopt a similar approach 
[for] community services in the area." (Trade journal 
submission, requested by MgmtAgency executives, Sep 
2011) 
 
Developments concerning mental healthcare services 
are mentioned as the first of four “current successes” to 
demonstrate MgmtAgency was now "clinically led at 
every level" (external presentations, Jul and Sep 2012). 
Success stories are limited to mentions of 
“progressing development of integrated care” 
(external presentations, Jul and Sep 2012). 
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Table 2: Change Facilitating and Inhibiting Conditions across Contract Management Practices 
 Hospital Contract Management Mental Health Contract Management Community Care Contract Management 
Designated 
change agents’ 
(un)willingness 
to challenge 
 
- (change inhibited) 
"It has been easier for [community and mental health 
services] to get GP engagement than the acute 
[hospitals]. Now, wouldn't you think that it would be the 
other way around? So, in terms of quality [reviews], I am 
still having to drag GPs into these [monitoring] meetings, 
kicking and screaming … so I am still struggling for GP 
engagement at LocalTeachingHospital and given this 
huge interest … I find that really quite surprising. " 
(MgmtAgency manager, interview, Dec 2012) 
Researcher: "Initially it was said that this change … 
would alter the power dynamics between budget 
holders and hospitals. Have you seen that happen?" 
LocalTeachingHospital manager: [laughs] "Not really." 
(interview, Sep 2014) 
+ (change facilitated) 
"[What] has changed as a result of GP involvement is 
the clinical support and challenging of MentalHealth 
Provider ... This has been very beneficial." 
(MgmtAgency manager, interview, Jun 2012) 
 
"GPs are able to clinically challenge some of the ideas 
and concepts that MentalHealth Provider come up 
with." (MgmtAgency manager, interview, Mar 2012) 
 
"'A little knowledge is a dangerous thing', I think, 
would fit with [the local GPs] really well ... [they say 
about mental healthcare services]: 'well, yeah, I know 
this.'" (MentalHealth clinician, interview,  Jan 2013) 
+ (change facilitated) 
"Everybody [at MgmtAgency] was moaning about 
CommunityProvider, particularly [GP X]" (GP, 
interview, Nov 2012). 
 
"Some of our senior staff, our clinical staff, were 
in a forum with GPs the other day and … GP 
leaders [were] at the front badmouthing what we 
were doing." (CommunityProvider manager, 
interview, Jul 2013). 
Coordination 
costs and 
scrutiny 
 
- (change inhibited) 
"[T]here are things that would work [in terms of] 
process changes which you cannot get through until 
you have convinced a clinician … and sometimes these 
are management and procedural things that actually 
you don't need clinical input for … And [the slow pace 
of decision making also arises] because … for some 
things there are simply too many decision-making 
bodies and too many groups with delegated 
authority." (MgmtAgency manager, interview, Aug 
2013) 
“With the new structure of [GP led contracting 
groups], basically those individual [groups] can set up 
whatever they want … A lot of what we’re pushing at 
the moment is to say to [them]: ‘Look guys, just come 
together and get a consensus and agreement.’” 
(LocalTeachingHospital manager, interview, Sep 2014) 
 
 
+ (change facilitated) 
"We are a very tight unit … we’re sort of a perfect team … 
there is never any [real tension]… There are only really four of 
us … The others are really quite peripheral.” (GP, interview, 
Aug 2012) 
 
"Most [GP colleagues] haven't really got the time ... The 
projects I am involved in require a lot more input than most of 
them, in all honesty, are probably providing, but that's fine… 
because, we don't need everyone to do it all. We just need 
one or two people to hold it together, really, and everybody 
contributes what they can." (GP, interview, May 2012) 
 
"The GPs are not that interested [in becoming involved in 
mental health contract management] actually; they’re quite 
interested in playing with the hospital, really" (MgmtAgency 
manager, interview, Oct 2010). 
- (change inhibited) 
"[GPs are] impossible to talk to as a group 
and even when you got them … as a group 
they talked about their individual problems … 
Conversations seem to be around, “what can 
we [contract] that will help our [own] GP 
practice perform?” … That is their starting 
position." (CommunityProvider manager, 
interview, Aug 2013) 
 
"There will be different winners and losers … 
For example, if you were to change the anti-
coagulation testing and put a unified service 
in [across the region] then ... the GPs in area 
A would lose out on their local enhanced 
service agreement, which would take 
resources away from them. So, straightaway 
you have got your ... colleagues 
disadvantaging the on the ground GPs. So, 
that can cause conflicts of interest and 
resentment." (GP, interview, Oct 2012) 
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Table 3: Stakeholders’ Existing Interests 
Stakeholder Interested in… Supporting evidence Strategy used 
to satisfy 
interest 
Supporting evidence Associated 
Practices 
GPs 
 
Medical 
knowledge and 
being part of 
medical 
community 
“If we want people [note: GPs] to go to a 
meeting … to talk about, you know, 
dressings, or whatever … it's nursing, you 
see? We are doctors” (GP, interview, Aug 
2014). 
"GPs won't listen to you unless you're a 
doctor" (provider clinician, informal 
conversation, May 2014). 
Maintain close 
relations with 
hospital doctors 
“If you have somebody who is particularly unwell, what you would really 
like to do is to speak to a specialist about them” (GP, interview, Aug 
2014). 
 
“[GP representatives] would want to negotiate contracts with the 
consultants [note: hospital doctors], not providers’ management" 
('brief notes and issues for further consideration' documented by 
MgmtAgency Chief Strategist following 'big conversations' with local 
GPs, Oct 2009). 
Mainly hospital 
services 
Responsive care 
for local 
patients 
“As a GP, you care about the patient in 
front of you. You care about your practice. 
You can care about a bigger area but, as 
soon as it becomes too big, you don't care” 
(GP, interview, Nov 2012). 
 
 
Closely monitor 
care 
arrangements 
“[GPs] are desperate to have better community services … So, yes 
they want to make a lot of noise about it, but kind of understandably, 
actually, [because] it causes us potentially the most grief.” (GP, 
interview, Aug 2014) 
“District nurses and social care and GPs look after the same 
population … and particularly the vulnerable and the sick. You know, 
there is no difference. We are seeing the same patients; we have got 
the same aims in terms of trying to keep them healthy” (GP, interview, 
Nov 2012). 
Listed healthcare management priorities across local GP rep groups: 
(a) shifting treatment from hospitals to community settings = 16, (b) 
community care services = 5, (c) prescribing medicine = 5, (d) hospital 
services = 4, (e) mental health = 2. 
All healthcare 
services, 
especially 
community care 
(due to high level 
of frail and elderly 
patients in the 
region) 
Financial 
income 
“It is about the remuneration … GPs are 
quite well paid in general, so if they work 
[in contract management] they need to be 
paid the same otherwise they will be less 
willing to do so … they are not so keen to 
lose money” (GP, interview, Aug 2014). 
Provide 
additional 
services 
Of registered "GPs with a Special Interest" in the region, 95 declared 
an interest in services that were also provided by local hospitals (e.g. 
dermatology), 76 in services provided by CommunityProvider (e.g. 
family planning), and 11 in mental health related issues. 
“Some GPs are quite commercial in their outlook [and] want to run 
this as their own service … So, there is a [GP who tried to] set up a sort 
of enlarged GP practice as a model, even though we have a 20% used 
[building with community care facilities] right next door.” 
(CommunityProvider manager, interview, Nov 2012) 
Mainly 
community care 
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Table 3: Stakeholders’ Existing Interests (cont.) 
Stakeholder Interested in… Supporting evidence Strategy used 
to satisfy 
interest 
Supporting evidence Associated 
Practices 
Mgmt-
Agency 
managers 
Reducing debt "[MgmtAgency’s] pressure was to get itself 
in balance…" (former MgmtAgency 
manager, interview, Aug 2013) 
Monitor 
increasing costs 
"…so, the board's focus ... was a very dominant acute player [i.e. 
hospital] and activity growing." (former MgmtAgency manager, Aug 
2013) 
“Everything, all the time in Galloways has been: ‘we have historical 
debt that we have to pay off!’ … So, we have spent all this time paying 
off all this debt and … trying not to give LocalTeachingHospital money” 
(GP, interview, Nov 2012). 
Mainly hospital 
contract 
management 
Meeting 
national targets 
"[MgmtAgency Directors] have been 
wedded to central government targets" 
(MentalHealth Provider manager, 
interview, Feb 2011). 
"[The important targets are] very much the 
ones that the Board, or the Department of 
Health or whatever are worried about. Are 
they okay?” (MgmtAgency manager, 
interview, Sep 2011)  
Monitor service 
providers’ 
performance 
reports 
"It tends to be ... follow the leader, who’s also following his leaders 
and ... so on, about whatever the latest sort of drama is. Like hospital 
infections, you know. [MgmtAgency Directors] will ask me, ‘what’s 
going on about hospital infections in the mental health ward?’ and 
you think, ‘well, I’m not really quite sure ... but it’s not really a big 
deal’. But it is, because it’s the top thing, you know, and that’s how it 
kind of works." (MgmtAgency manager, interview, Oct 2012) 
“You're really making sure that the things that might cause trouble 
from the center are covered ... Data can be good or bad but as long as 
it's not the thing the Department's worried about, then we're okay." 
(MgmtAgency manager, interview, Sep 2011) 
Mainly hospital 
contract 
management 
Leveraging own 
experience 
“Before [becoming a contract manager], I 
was working in long-term conditions in a 
provider organization … I’ve always 
preferred [contract management to 
working at a provider]; I’m a nurse by 
background and I used to actually get quite 
frustrated with some areas of professional 
practice: why aren’t we doing things 
better?” (MgmtAgency manager, 
interview, Nov 2010). 
Work in service 
area related to 
own experience 
MgmtAgency managers who gained clinical experience at… 
Hospitals: 0, Mental healthcare providers: 0, Community care 
providers > 10 (including social care) 
[note: MgmtAgency had provided the majority of local community 
care services prior to contracting them from CommunityProvider] 
Mainly 
community care 
contract 
management 
 
  
  57 
 
 
 
Table 4: Strategic Change Initiatives’ Direction of Stakeholders’ Interests 
Actions Supporting evidence Direct interests towards 
Associating control of financial healthcare budgets with responsive 
care for local patients 
(associating with potential gains and losses) 
 “We are about to fall off a financial cliff … Our current commissioning [note: contract 
management] system is broken” (MgmtAgency presentation to local GPs, Dec 2009). 
“[MgmtAgency’s new Chief Strategist] came in and we had these big conversations and we 
[GPs] understood that unless we had [control of] real budgets nothing would change … We 
had quite a few of us who were quite keen to do it” (GP, interview, Nov 2012) 
“The initial reaction … was ‘why should we take on a … budget?’ However, when posed 
with the question ‘what would you do with a budget of £X?’ this made people think and 
change their minds” (GP group meeting minutes, Oct 2009). 
Healthcare contract 
management practices 
Associating hospital expenses with responsive care for local 
patients (associating with potential gains and losses) 
"[MgmtAgency managers] had been coming ... to tell us about the problems at 
MgmtAgency ... and saying: 'This is the problem. Maybe we could do something for 
referrals?' ... I started off doing a bit of [hospital] admission avoidance work." (GP, 
interview, Feb 2012) 
"[MgmtAgency] went into large historical debt ... So that involved me ... trying to get 
general practice [GPs] to play its part in recovery [by] optimizing referrals and prescribing ... 
And one thing I did was I started up a [hospital] referral management service." (GP, 
interview, Aug 2013) 
Hospital contract 
management 
Allocating executive time and internal meetings towards certain 
stakeholders and issues 
(allocating space on the organizational agenda) 
MgmtAgency’s new Chief Strategist’s meetings with local provider representatives: 
Hospitals: 31; Community Care: 4; Mental Health: 1 (Public calendar entries over 12 month 
period) 
 
‘Contract Oversight Group’ meetings regularly begin with lengthy review of hospital related 
expenses (sources: observation notes; meeting minutes; audio recordings) 
Mainly hospital contract 
management 
Assigning formal roles and responsibilities 
(organizational restructuring) 
2009 Org Chart: 
Hospital Contract Management: 1 Director + 9 managers; Out of Hospital (Community 
Services and Mental Health) Contract Management: 1 Director + 7 managers 
 
2012 Org Chart: 
Hospital Contract Management: 3.5 Directors + 13.1 managers; Community Care Contract 
Management: 0.5 Directors + 4.6 managers; Mental Health Contract Management: 0 
Directors + 2 managers 
Mainly hospital contract 
management 
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Figure 1: Relevant stakeholders and practices 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Excerpt from MgmtAgency Strategy Presentation 
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Figure 3: Resourcing across Practices in Strategic Change 
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First of all, we would like to thank you once again for conditionally accepting this paper for 
publication and for your very constructive feedback and guidance. 
 
I think you have made progress to address my remaining concerns but I think your introduction could 
use some nice polish. The writing is very choppy, something which doesn't generate excitement 
about your paper. Furthermore, I was confused by the set up to your research question, which appears 
to have emerged after you collected your data. This leaves unresolved what motivated your data 
collection in the first place. Please revisit the first 8 pages of your manuscript. It might help to also 
have a fresh set of eyes examine it. I know I struggle to see problems in my framing of manuscripts 
after reading it so many times. 
 
My hope is that with some more changes, your paper will truly be ready for AMJ. I know it might be 
a bit frustrating to have to make additional changes after a conditional acceptance, but I think my 
suggestions will make your paper even more impactful. 
 
We agree with your comments and thank you for the opportunity to make the paper more 
impactful. As per your suggestion we have collected feedback from colleagues and considerably 
re-worked the front end of the paper to make it clearer and more engaging. Specifically, we have 
started the introduction by referring to an empirical problem that motivated data collection before 
highlighting the surprising finding that emerged during our study. Furthermore, we now end the 
introduction with a clearer summary of theoretical contributions. 
 
We have also made stylistic changes to the literature review section and prefaced it with a brief 
introduction to the relevant literature streams that we then discuss in turn. 
 
We hope our changes meet your expectations and very much look forward to hearing from you 
again soon. 
  
 
